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The Great Nuclear Debate*
Eugene V. Rostowt
The last few months have witnessed a healthy increase in public con-
cern about the state of our security in general and about nuclear arms
and nuclear arms control agreements in particular. Since I have tried
for years to stir up popular interest in these matters, I can only cheer.
We cannot hope to restore a strong, confident, bipartisan foreign pol-
icy-and surely that is a national objective of primordial importance-
until there has been a thorough, civil, and disciplined debate about
what our foreign policy is for-what it is supposed to accomplish, and
by what means. Such a debate should produce a new state of public
opinion, the only legitimate source of policy in a democracy.
Before I comment on some of the issues which are attracting so much
attention on the arms control front these days, let me recall a few fun-
damental propositions by way of framework. ,
The first principle of President Reagan's approach to arms control
and disarmament has been to insist that arms control be viewed as an
integral part of our foreign and defense policy as a whole. l Arms con-
trol is not a magical activity, which can produce peace by incantation,
without pain, and without tears. The other day one ofmy children sent
me a cartoon of the 1930s by the famous British cartoonist David Low.
The cartoon makes President Reagan's point perfectly. Low never
drew a figure for "Disarmament" without a twin figure labelled "Col-
lective Security." Unless collective security is fully and visibly re-
stored, we in ACDA are going to wear out the seats of a good many
pairs of pants during the next couple of years. Arms control negotia-
tions can be a useful element in a strategy for achieving peace. But
they are not a substitute for such a strategy, nor, equally, are they a
substitute for programs designed to restore the military balance with
the Soviet Union.
* Speech delivered at Yale Law School on April 23, 1982. The footnotes have 1?een
provided by The Yale Journal of World Public Order.
t Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Sterling Professor of Law
and Public Affairs, Yale University (on leave 1982-83).
1. President Reagan in his first press conference put the Soviet Union on notice that
arms control agreements would not 1?e negotiated in a vacuum. Rather, one had to consider
"all the other things that are going on." Press CO'!ference, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1981, at AlO,
col. 1.
87
HeinOnline -- 8 Yale J. World Pub. Ord. 88 1981-1982
The Yale Journal of World Public Order Vol. 8:87, 1981
Second, we must guard against the illusion that negotiating with the
Soviet Union about arms control is in itself "a restraining influence" on
Soviet behavior. This view is wishful thinking and nothing more. We
negotiated about arms control with the Soviet Union throughout the
1970s. It was a disastrous period in the history of the Cold War, not
only in South East Asia, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Africa, but
in the development and deployment of many new and improved Soviet
weapons systems. Ofcourse the United States is in favor of negotiating
with the Soviet Union about arms control and every other aspect of
foreign policy. Indeed, we are doing so now in Geneva about interme-
diate range nuclear weapons. But we must not confuse hope with real-
ity. And we must not fall into the treaty trap: negotiating with the
Soviet Union is not like playing croquet.
Third, I might stress once more that nuclear arms do not exist in a
vacuum. The secret is out of the laboratory, and there is no way to put
it back. Mankind has eaten the apple and must live with the conse-
quences. Any industrialized country can make nuclear weapons. The
West must therefore retain the weapon if only to prevent its possible
use by others. Moreover, there is a close and fundamental connection
between the nuclear weapon and the use of conventional forces, as the
Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated twenty years ago.2
We must design both our military and diplomatic policies, and our
arms control policies, on the basis of these inescapable facts. There is
no way to build an impermeable wall between the use of nuclear and
conventional weapons. Just as small nuclear wars may become big
ones, so small or large conventional wars could escalate to the nuclear
level if nuclear powers are involved. We cannot be sure that we can
keep the demon in its cage forever. In order to prevent the horror of
nuclear war, therefore, we and our allies, and other nations devoted to
peace, must take responsibility for the agreed rules of world public or-
der against all forms of aggression, conventional and nuclear. The ef-
2. G. ALLISON, EsSENCE OF DECISION 240 (1971). One fact of the missile crisis is indis-
putable-U.S. strategic dominance. .
Any member of the Soviet government seriously concerned with the Soviet strategic
capability against the United States, and informed of the facts, had to be frightened by
the end of 1961. ... [T]he United States was not on the short side of the missile gap;
rather, United States strategic superiority was considerable.
Id. Without confidence in our strategic capability, President Kennedy would have been
more reluctant to employ the conventional capabilities of the United States toward the suc-
cessful result obtained in 1962. He might well have been tempted by the Soviet suggestion
that the U.S. remove its missiles from Turkey as a direct quid pro quo for the destruction of
Soviet missiles in Cuba. This type of nuclear blackmail is precisely the danger accepted by
any state willing to accept strategic inferiority.
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fectiveness of these rules has declined since the American withdrawal
from Vietnam. Until their influence is restored, there is little chance
for achieving meaningful arms control. And the United States must be
prepared to deter the possibility of political coercion based on the
threat to use nuclear weapons.
In my judgment, this is by far the greatest of the nuclear dangers we
face-not nuclear war but nuclear blackmail. The President of the
United States must never be put in a position where he would have to
choose between abandoning a vital American interest and launching
nuclear war. That is the essence of the policy of deterrence which has
worked successfully since 1945. It must continue to be the goal of our
security and our arms control policies.
The fourth preliminary point I might evoke is a simple one: the
ground swell of concern about the nuclear problem throughout the
Western world is not a mysterious phenomenon, a plague visited on us
from the heavens, or a hobgoblin created by Soviet propaganda. It has
a perfectly natural cause.
The Soviet Union has pulled out all the stops of a great propaganda
campaign to persuade us that the cause of our anxiety is a nuclear arms
race. This clearly is not the case. Wars are not caused by arms races or
the activities of "merchants of death." They are caused by predation,
fear, or the faith of zealots and crusaders. In any event, there has been
no nuclear arms race. For ten years or more the Soviet military estab-
lishment has increased at the rate of some 4 percent a year in real
terms-8 percent a year in the nuclear area.3 During the same period,
the armed forces of the West remained stable or fell behind. Now the
West is trying to modernize its forces after the long pause of the 1970s,
and to close certain critical gaps which have developed. But the West-
ern effort to restore the military balance with the Soviet Union is not
the cause of the current concern about war throughout the West. It is a
symptom of that concern and a response to it. The West is not seeking
nuclear superiority in any sense of the term. The United States is try-
ing only to reestablish its second strike capacity so that we and our
allies can deter Soviet aggression and nuclear blackmail against the
United States, its allies, and their supreme interests.
The cause of the recent increase in anxiety about war throughout the
3. NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT-FoRCE COMPARISONS 65 (NATO 1982). The So-
viet Union spends roughly 12 to 14% of its GNP on its military. NATO, as a group. spends
roughly 5%. Id. U[O]verall. the Soviet military budget exceeds that of the United States by
some 50 percent, the cost of their strategic nuclear programs has, for some years, been triple
ours." Nitze, A Strategyfor the 1980's, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 91 (1980).
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West is the Soviet program of expansion, based on a formidable and
continuing military buildup, and a willingness to use aggressive war as
an instrument of national policy. There is no way in which Soviet be·
havior can be explained as defensive or reconciled· with the rules of
world public order. The process of Soviet expansion no longer con·
cerns remote coaling stations. It affects areas of great and immediate
strategic importance like the Middle East, the Caribbean, and the ap·
proaches to Europe and Japan. The Soviet Union's use of aggression
as a tool ofpolicy has weakened the taboos against the use of force and
encouraged other nations to follow its example, as we see today in the
South Atlantic and elsewhere. As a result, the state system has been
slipping towards anarchy.
Naturally, the Soviet drive for hegemony and its consequences have
touched sensitive nerves throughout the West. And our people-and
people throughout the world-are responding. A Senator told me the
other day that what his constituents are saying on these matters is
something altogether familiar to a politician, and of the utmost impor·
tance: "Do something." Our people are not committed to any particu·
lar solution, he said: a freeze at current levels, a no-first-use pledge, or
any other formula, and they certainly do not support either unilateral
disarmament or unilateral nuclear disarmament. But they emphatical-
ly want their government to do whatever is prudent and reasonable to
protect the interests of the nation and to prevent war. As usual, the
people are absolutely right.
Actually, public opinion and national policy have moved a long way
from the post-Vietnam panic and paralysis of the mid-1970s. We are
already more than halfway back to "Collective Security." I don't mean
to suggest that the post-Vietnam retreat to isolationism is over. One
could hardly say that so soon after the publication of the article in For·
eign AffairS advocating a no-first-use-policy by Robert McNamara, Ge-
rard Smith, McGeorge Bundy, and George Kennan and other
manifestations of the isolationist spirit.4 But the post-Vietnam foreign
policy debate in the United States is now in its second stage. The four
years of debate which culminated in the election of President Reagan
and his first two years in office have accomplished a good deal. Ameri-
cans now recognize the imperial character of Soviet foreign policy and
the magnitude of the military buildup on which it is based. They un-
derstand that Soviet expansion has proceeded too far-that it has be-
4. Bundy, Kennan, McNamara & Smith. Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance, 60
FOREIGN AFF. 753-68 (1982).
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come a threat to the balance of world power and the system of public
order which necessarily depends upon it. And they have concluded
that the United States made a mistake during the 1970s in allowing the
Soviet Union to catch up to the United States in military power, and
then forge ahead.
There is a solid American consensus in favor of restoring the conven-
tional an~ nuclear military balance so that we and our allies can pro-
tect our interests in peace, by the methods of alliance diplomacy
backed by adequate deterrent force.
Today, we are facing the next set of security problems, those which
require U$ to define those interests in detail, and to develop a strategy
for safeguarding them. What is the role of nuclear weapons in our ar-
senal and in the Soviet arsenal? What is the relation between nuclear
and conventional weapons? What are our objectives in arms control
negotiations with the Soviet Union, and what are the objectives of the
Soviet Union?
On these questions, consensus does not yet exist. It is the great task
of the political process during the next few years to attain it.
The answers President Reagan and his administration have given to
these questions are firmly rooted in the history of our experience since
1945. The President has made it clear that we will not retreat to For-
tress America, but will defend out alliances and our interests through-
out the world. Secretary of State Haig has said that we can no longer
tolerate a "double standard" with regard to Soviet aggression.5 Both
we and the Soviet Union must obey the same rules with regard to the
international use of force-the rules to which we both agreed when we
signed the United Nations Charter. This is the only acceptable mean-
ing for that elusive word, "detente." And we are approaching the task
of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union for the first time on
the basis of the realistic view that we and the Soviet Union have differ-
ent doctrines about the role of nuclear weapons, and therefore different
conceptions of arms control.6
For us, nuclear weapons exist to deter the use of nuclear weapons
and other forms of aggression against our supreme interests as a nation.
Our weapons are exclusively defensive in character, and the mission of
5. N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1981, at I, col. 5 (quoting former Sec'y Alexander Haig).
6. Pipes, Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War, C.OMMEN-
TARY, July, 1977, at 21. "There is something innately destabilizing in the very fact that we
consider nuclear war unfeasible and suicidal for both, and our chief adversary views it as
feasible and winnable for himself." Id. at 34.
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our nuclear arsenal is to deter aggression by presenting a visible and
credible capacity to retaliate as the conclusive deterrent.
It is now clear that the Soviet Union has an entirely different military
doctrine. For the Soviet military, the nuclear weapon is the ultimate
sanction behind a program of endless expansion conducted by the ag-
gressive use of conventional forces, subversion, and terrorism. The So-
viet nuclear weapon is deployed to deter our deterrent by threatening
to overwhelm it, and thus make Soviet aggression possible. Some 75
percent or 80 percent of the Soviet nuclear force consists of ICBMs-
swift, accurate, and extremely destructive first-strike weapons which
could destroy missiles deployed in hardened silos.7 No defenses yet
qualify their power to destroy and no American weapon compares in
destructive power to the heavy Soviet missiles. The large Soviet ballis-
tic missiles are weapons of intimidation and they exist already in such
numbers, and with such capabilities as to cast doubt on the ability of
United States forces to survive and retaliate-that is to say, they cast
doubt on our nuclear guaranties.8
The Soviet lead in ground-based intermediate-range and interconti-
nental ballistic missiles is the most serious foreign policy problem we
face.9 This advantage gives the Soviet Union the potential to improve
its military and political position through a first strike against our
ICBM force, our submarines in port, and our bombers on the ground.
The menace of nuclear imbalance in that sense is being translated into
political currents of great power, as we have seen during the last few
years. The deployment of vast numbers of warheads on Soviet inter-
mediate-range SS-20s and on ICBMs is designed to make our flesh
crawl, and to induce acute political anxiety in Europe and elsewhere at
a time when the American intercontinental nuclear guaranty is being
questioned.
The combination of these pressures is a recipe for nuclear coercion.
Henry Kissinger deepened Western anxiety about the nuclear imbal-
ance a few years ago with his celebrated comment that great powers did
7. See FORCE COMPARISONS, supra note 3, at 41.
8. Id. at 43. With over 4800 warheads deployed on SS-18s and -19s alone, the Soviet
Union has enough accurate, large, modem warheads to target each U.S. ICBM silo with two
warheads and still maintain a large strategic reserve. Id.
9. See id. at 45. The Soviet lead in INF is particularly pronounced. Despite a pledge to
halt construction of SS-20 sites, the Soviet Union has continued its massive build-up of
intermediate-range nuclear weapons. The Soviets now have over 1200 ballistic missile war-
heads on SS-4s, -55, and, of course, the modem, accurate, and mobile SS-20 (accounting for
more than 900 of the warheads). Id. By comparison, NATO deploys 108 Pershing IA and
36 Lance missiles, neither of which is in the same class with the SS-20 in terms of range or
accuracy.
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not commit suicide on behalf of their allies. lO But political anxieties
about the nuclear umbrella would have existed even if Dr. Kissinger
had not spoken. They are what Chancellor Schmidt has called "sub-
liminal" emanations of the Soviet nuclear arsena1. 11 They are there.
The pressures of Soviet nuclear mobilization have other effects.
There has been a conspicuous increase in the number of Americans
who are seriously advocating an American return to neutrality and iso-
lation, as if that approach to foreign policy were an available option for
the United States. Such American voices have their inevitable echo in
Europe, Japan, and other parts of the world dependent upon American
protection: the chorus advocating American isolation and accommoda-
tion to Soviet power is answered abroad by advocates of neutrality on
the one hand, and of nuclear armament on the other.
In the light of these considerations, President Reagan decided to
make the removal of the destabilizing Soviet advantage in ground-
based ballistic missiles the first goal of our arms control effort, and the
first aspect of the problem for us to take up with the Soviet Union.12
We were slightly ahead of the Soviet Union in the number of warheads
on deployed ICBMs in 1972.13 In 1982, the Soviets have a lead in this
crucial area ofapproximately three to one. It follows that they have the
capacity to destroy our ICBMs and other nuclear forces with a fraction
of their forces, holding the rest in an ominous reserve which could par-
alyze our remaining strategic forces. Until this Soviet bulge in nuclear
power is eliminated, either by arms control or by American moderniza-
tion efforts-until, that is, a presumptive Soviet first strike ceases to be
plausible, and the Soviet strategic arsenal is confined to the role of de-
terrence-it will not be possible to restore political stability.
The New York Times put the issue well in an editorial entitled How
Much is Enough? The task of arms control diplomacy, the Times said,
is to allow the United States to maintain deterrence, "which has kept
the industrial world at peace for the longest stretch in history" and "to
10. Speech ofSept. 1, 1979, SURVIVAL, Nov./Dec. 1979, at 266. See also N.Y. Times,
Sept. 2, 1979, at 7, col. I; id. Sept. 4, 1979, at 10, col. 3.
II. SURVIVAL, Jan./Feb. 1978, at 2.
12. Land-based ballistic missiles combine rapid flight time, high yields, and great accu-
racy with a high degree of vulnerability. This combination makes them uniquely destabi-
lizing weapons. For that reason, the U.S. has chosen to concentrate upon them in its arms
control proposals.
13. Although the Soviet Union had already roughly a 50% advantage in the number of
land-based ballistic missiles in 1972 (U.S. 1054 to U.S.S.R. 1530), THE MILITARY BALANCE,
INT'L INST. STRATEGIC STUD. 67 (1973), acquisition of the MIRV technology at the begin-
ning of the 70's gave the U.S. a slight advantage in total deliverable ICBM warheads. The
Soviet Union, however, quickly followed with MIRV capability and now it outstrips the
U.S. in ICBM warhead levels.
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forbid the weapons which defy deterrence. . That done, the arms
race can subside. Unless it is done, there will never be enough."14
This view of the matter is the basis for our approach both to the
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks now going on in Ge-
neva and the START talks the President proposed at Eureka College
on May 9.15 In these talks, we shall sharply distinguish purely retalia-
tory weapons from those which have first strike potentialities. What we
are seeking in these talks, which are closely related in subject matter, is
to achieve stability at equal and much lower levels of force-a posture
on each side which would permit us to deter both nuclear war and
other forms of aggression against our supreme interests. Such a policy
would deny the Soviet Union the capacity for nuclear blackmail based
on superiority in ground-based intermediate-range and intercontinen-
tal ballistic missiles.
In the INF talks, as you know, we have proposed that all the Soviet
SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles be dismantled. In exchange, we would
not deploy our 572 Pershing II and ground-based cruise missiles in Eu-
rope, pursuant to the NATO decision of 1979.16
The Soviet Union has bitterly attacked our INF proposal as unfair,
on the ground that it would require the Soviets to make a larger reduc-
tion than we would be called upon to makeP This is hardly the case,
since the sacrifice offuture weapons is not really different from disman-
tling existing arsenals. But even if it were true, it would be irrelevant.
Arms control negotiations are not bargains among peasants haggling
over the price of potatoes at a country fair. The Soviet Union and the
United States, the two leading nuclear powers, are trustees for human-
ity, and should do whatever is necessary to help lift the cloud of war
from the horizon of the future. I am glad to note that six months after
President Reagan's speech of November 18 on intermediate-range mis-
siles, European and American opinion, and opinion throughout the
Western world, solidly supports the principle of our INF proposals as
14. How Much Is Enough?, N.Y. Times (editorial), Apr. 11, 1982, § 4, at 16, col.!.
15. Presidential Speech at Eureka College, May 9, 1982, reprinted in N.Y. Times, May
10, 1982, at 14, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Eureka Speech].
16. The "zero option" was first proposed by President Reagan on Nov. 18, 1981 in a
speech to the National Press Club, and is reported at N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1981, at 17, col. 1.
"17. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 5; id., Nov. 20, 1981, at 9, col. 1. On Dec. 1,
1981, the Politburo denounced the "zero option" as an attempt to obtain "the Soviet Union's
unilateral disarmament." Id., Dec. 1, 1981, at 7, col. 1. Earlier, the U.S.S.R. had denounced
the INF proposal as "a propaganda ploy designed to stalemate the Geneva talks and to
present the American course of escalating the arms race and insuring military superiority as
a 'peace initiative'...." Id., Nov. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 5.
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altogether fair and equitable. IS After all, no state has a right we must
acknowledge to build a military force which could be used only for
purposes of aggression.
The President's proposals for the START negotiations are equally
sound and equitable. They propose equal ceilings at much lower levels
.offorce-ceilings that would strengthen deterrence and promote stabil-
ity by significantly reducing the Soviet lead in ICBMs. Coupled with
the dismantling of the Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles, such
a result would enable us to maintain an overall level of strategic nu-
clear capability sufficient to deter conflict, safeguard our national se-
curity, and meet our commitments to allies and friends.
To achieve this goal, the President announced a practical, phased
approach to the negotiation, like the procedure being used in the INF
talks. It is based on the principle that the two arsenals should be equal
both in the number of weapons and in their destructive capacity. "The
focus of our efforts," the President said, ''will be to reduce significantly
the most destabilizing systems-ballistic missiles-the number of war-
heads they carry and their overall destructive potential."19 While no .
aspect of the problem is excluded from consideration, the United States
proposes that the first phase of the negotiation should reduce ballistic
missile warheads to equal levels at least one-third below current num-
bers. Furthermore, to enhance stability, we will propose that no more
than half these warheads be deployed on land-based missiles. This
provision alone should achieve substantial reductions in missile throw
weight. Our proposal calls for these warhead reductions, as well as sig-
nificant reductions in the number of deployed missiles, to be achieved
as quickly as possible.
In a second phase, closely linked to the first, we will seek equal ceil-
ings on other elements of US and Soviet strategic forces, including
equal limits on ballistic missile throw weight at less than current US
levels.
In both phases of the START talks, we shall insist on verification
measures capable of assuring compliance. In the case of provisions
that cannot be monitored effectively by national technical means of
verification, we will propose cooperative measures, data exchanges, and
collateral constraints that can provide the necessary confidence in com-
pliance. The Soviet Union has already told us-and Mr. Brezhnev has
18. The NATO nations have strongly endorsed the U.S. negotiating position at the INF
talks, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 4, and at START, id., May 18, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
19. Eurelca Speech, supra note 15.
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said publicly-that it will accept reasonable verification procedures of
this kind to supplement national technical means of verification.
The Soviet Union has attacked our START proposals as unfair, on
the ground that they call for unequal reductions-indeed, that they call
for "unilateral Soviet disarmament."2o It is hardly obvious why this is
the case. Each side now has approximately 7500 ballistic missile war-
heads. Under the American proposal each side would have to reduce
to no more than 5000, of which no more than 2500 could be on ICBMs.
True, the Soviet Union would have to dismantle more ICBM warheads
than we would in order to comply with the ICBM sublimit, while we
might have to dismantle more submarine-based missiles. But that is
the point. There is nothing inequitable about an equal ceiling which
strengthens deterrent stability.
The significance of this approach as a step towards stabilizing the
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union highlights
the shortcomings of the familiar popular outcry that there is nuclear
"over-kill," that is, that there are enough weapons on each side to de-
stroy the world many times over. Many use this assertion to support
the claim that no more nuclear weapons are required and that a freeze
at current levels could do us no harm. It may be that a rose is a rose is
a rose, although as a gardener I have never believed that Gertrude
Stein's famous sentence made sense. But all nuclear weapons are not
equal. Some are more accurate and destructive than others, and some
must cope with defenses. Until we make the Soviet first-strike scenario
inconceivable, our nuclear guaranty to our allies in Europe, Asia, and
the Middle East will remain in some doubt. A state of doubt on this
crucial point increases the risk to our security.
These aspects of the nuclear problem expose the fallacies of the argu-
ment recently put forward in favor of accepting the Soviet Union's fre-
quent proposal for a pledge that we not use nuclear weapons first even
if Soviet tanks were rolling across the German plains toward the Eng-
lish Channel.21 The American pledge to use nuclear weapons if neces-
sary to defend our allies against Soviet aggression has been the basis
for the recovery and cultural renaissance of Western Europe, Japan,
20. Tass Indicates Moscow View of Warhead Cuts Is Negative, N.Y. Times, May 11,
1982, at 4, col. 3; id., May 19, 1982, at I, col. 6 (Brezhnev declares START proposals as
"absolutely onesided").
21. Bundy et al, supra note 4. The authors of the recent "no-first-use" article appear to
recommend that NATO accept defeat rather than resort to the defensive use of nuclear
weapons. "It seems much better that even the most responsible choice of even the most
limited nuclear actions to prevent even the most imminent conventional disaster should be
left out of authorized policy." Id. at 762.
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and many other parts of the world since 1945. For thirty-five years, it
has been the counterweight to Soviet superiority in manpower, tanks,
and other conventional arms. In Ambassador Nitze's words, it would
be tempting fate "to remove the essential prop of nuclear deterrence
before rectifying the conditions that led to its fashioning in the first
place." Such a step would deprive NATO of all credibility. And it
would give a new and terrifying impetus to the process of nuclear
weapons proliferation. For countries threatened with destruction,
doubt about the American nuclear guaranty is an invitation to take the
nuclear option. To propose in effect the abrogation of NATO and the
other security treaties on which our safety as a nation depends cannot
be a serious or credible policy. It would inevitably result in a retreat to
the isolationism of the nineteenth century.
It is difficult to follow the argument for a no-first-use pledge made in
the Foreign Affairs article.22 The authors concede that we would have
no way of being confident that the Soviet Union would in fact fight
only with conventional weapons. After all, Soviet doctrine and Soviet
equipment are based on the full integration of nuclear and chemical
weapons into the battlefield tactics of the Soviet armed forces.23 And
Soviet tactical doctrine relies on pre-emption, not passive defense.24 Of
course, proponents of the no-first-use principle tell us, we should have
to be ready to reply in kind if the Soviet Union should use nuclear
weapons first. But if we have to be prepared to use nuclear weapons
after all, what has been gained by the no-first-use pledge they advocate,
except to make nuclear war more likely?
But our security treaties with Europe, Japan, and other key countries
22. Note that four prominent German writers, representing diverse parties and back-
grounds, unequivocally rejected the proposal of Bundy et al, in the issue of Foreign Affairs
following the "no-first-use" article. Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation ofPeace: A Ger-
man Response, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 1157 (1982). They found the implications of a no-first-use
pledge "profoundly disturbing," arguing that it would "destroy the confidence of Europeans
and especially Germans in the European-American Alliance as a community of risk, and
would endanger the strategic unity of the Alliance and the security of Western Europe." Id.
at 1161-62. The authors also focus on the role that nuclear :-veapons played in preserving the
peace in Europe for the last 37 years-"[t]he primary function of nuclear weapons is deter-
rence in order to prevent aggression and blackmail." Id. at 1159.
23. The Soviet chemical warfare capabilities are disturbing. "[I]t is clear that chemical
and bacteriological warfare agents are important components of the Soviet military arsenal,
to be used whenever and wherever that use is deemed advantageous." Douglass, Chemical
Weapons: An Imbalance of Terror, 10 STRATEGIC REV. 46 (1982). Indeed, available evi-
dence indicates that the Soviet Union and its allies are currently using chemical and biologi-
cal weapons in Afghanistan and Kampuchea. CHEMICAL WARFARE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
AND AFGHANISTAN, DEP'T OF ST. SPECIAL REPORT No. 98, Mar. 22, 1982.
24. See Pipes, supra note 6, at 31 ("The costliest lesson which the Soviet mi}itary learned
in World War II was the importance ofsurprise.... Given the rapidity ofmodern warfare
... not to be surprised by the enemy means, in effect, to inflict surprise on him.").
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are not gestures of sentiment or philanthropy, to be abandoned if the
going gets rough. They represent bedrock security interests of the
United States. One has only to consider where we would be if we ac-
cepted the no-first-use argument and abandoned Europe to its fate.
For more than twenty years, Soviet military and political strategy has
been based on the concept that the nation which controls the Eurasian
land mass controls the world. Ifthe Soviet Union could gain control of
Western Europe, the Soviet leaders believe, it would auto~atically con-
trol the Middle East and Africa as well. Japan, China, and many other
countries would draw the necessary conclusions, and accommodate to
the power of the Soviets. The United States would be left isolated and
impotent.
Proposals for a nuclear freeze at current levels would be almost as
devastating in their effect as the thesis of Mr. McNamara and his
friends. By halting our current modernization efforts, such a freeze
would leave our nuclear guaranty in doubt, and therefore reduce our
capacity to protect Europe, Japan, and other supreme national inter-
ests. It would remove any incentive the Soviets might have to accept
the substantial reductions we are seeking both in START and INF.
And it would constitute, in effect, a unilateral American renunciation
of the joint NATO decision of 1979 to modernize Western intermedi-
ate-range forces.25 It would therefore adversely affect allied confidence
in our leadership and steadfastness.
Some students of the security problem are urging President Reagan
to ask the Senate to consent to the ratification of SALT II, preferably
with four or five amendments, before we proceed with START. Advo-
cates of this position point out that both the Soviet Union and the
United States are respecting the limits on deployed launchers provided
for in that Treaty. They ask why we shouldn't ratify the Treaty and get
on with its successor.
It is quite true that both nations are, in general, observing the limits
on deployment provided for in SALT II. It is a normal diplomatic pro-
cedure not to rock the boat unduly during negotiations;. for the mo-
ment, the SALT II limits are in the interests of both nations.
But the formal ratification of SALT II would be an altogether differ-
ent matter.
25. U.S. failure to follow through on the 1979 modernization decision could have nega-
tive consequences on intra-Alliance relations and on NATO's credibility in the eyes of the
Soviet Union. See Treverton, Nuclear Weapons in Europe, ADELPHI PAPER No. 168, INT'L
INST. STRATEGIC STUD. 2 (1981); NATO TODAY: THE ALLIANCE IN EVOLUTION, S. FOR-
EIGN REL. COMM. 5 (1982).
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In the first place, if we should ratify SALT II, amended or un-
amended, the SALT Treaty would inevitably constitute the starting
point and base line for the START negotiations. That fact would al-
most surely force us to use the wrong unit of account in negotiating a
new agreement. The Interim Agreement of SALT I and SALT II are
based on deployed launchers as the unit of account. It is now obvious
that deployed launchers are an inadequate way to measure and com-
pare the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons. President Reagan
has decided to base the START treaty directly on the number of mis-
sile warheads and their destructive potential. That is the only sensible
way to compare the military and political significance of ballistic mis-
siles. To ratify SALT II now would simply perpetuate what turned out
to be a costly error.
One of the worst consequences of that error is that neither the In-
terim Agreement nor SALT II succeeded in preventing the emergence
of Soviet superiority in ground-based ballistic missiles which threaten
the survivability of our ICBMs. To prevent and now to eliminate that
Soviet advantage has always ~een a major United States interest and
objective in nuclear arms limitation agreements. The ratification of
SALT II would codify and confirm both the present high ceilings and
the Soviet position of superiority in this area.
As Senator Jackson said in recent testimony, it would be "a profound
mistake" to legitimize the nuclear status quo. Such a step would lock
the United States into a position of strategic inferiority, and make it
impossible for us to escape. It would therefore make it nearly impossi-
ble for the United States to solve its most urgent security problem: to
end the growing doubts about the American nuclear guaranty for Eu-
rope, Japan, and other vital American interests. As a result, ratifying
SALT II would eliminate any possible motive the Soviet Union might
have to agree to reductions.26
There is another pitfall in the SALT II ratification proposal. The
Soviet Union could also propose amendments, and we could spend the
next few years renegotiating SALT II rather than attempting to per-
suade the Soviet Union to accept a treaty which would help to stabilize
the political and military relationship between the two countries.
These reasons alone are sufficient justification for refusing to ratify
SALT II. There are many lesser reasons for reaching the same conclu-
26. See Nitze, supra note 3 (''The prospect of the Soviet Union agreeing to. . . a treaty
in a fonn which would meet our needs and those of the West, is ... low unless we have
earlier demonstrated that we are prepared and able to handle our strategic security without a
SALT treaty.").
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sion-the failure to include the Backfire bomber, for example; to elimi-
nate the Soviet heavy missiles; or to prevent the encryption of
telemetry.
In the end, however, those who advocate ratifying SALT II now are
motivated by altogether different reasons, which have nothing to do
with the actual provisions of the Treaty. Some believe that the overall
political and military situation of the United States is hopeless, and
that we should make a nuclear arms agreement with the Soviet Union
as an act of submission, on the best terms we can get. There is no need
for me to characterize this pernicious outlook. Others subscribe to the
view that even a bad agreement with the Soviet Union somehow con-
tributes to peace and reduces the risk of war. The bitter history of the
1970s should teach us that there is no substance in this view. If the
Soviet Union should ever conclude, however, that this opinion domi-
nates American policy, whether out of mistaken conviction or for rea-
sons of electoral politics, the prospects for negotiation would be dim
indeed. Those who favor a few quick cosmetic amendments for SALT
II and calling the result START I are not advancing the interests of the
nation.
President Reagan is eager to reach a sound agreement with the So-
viet Union-an agreement which contributes to our security and fur-
thers the cause of peace. But he will never approve a poor agreement
for the sake of having an agreement.
There has been much talk in the press and in Congress about the
"acceptability" or "negotiability" of the principles and guidelines Pres-
ident Reagan had proposed. Predicting Soviet behavior is not easy and
I am not a card-carrying Sovietologist. I admire people who tell us
with assurance exactly what the Soviet Union will and will not do. On
this arcane subject, I think it is safe, however, to risk a simple
observation.
The Soviet Union did not achieve its advantage in ground-launched
ballistic missiles in a fit of absence of mind. It spent years of effort and
billions of dollars in doing ·so. And it will give this advantage up only
when it is convinced that the alternatives are worse. That is why we
say that arms control agreements can only be understood and negoti-
ated in the context of our foreign and defense policy as a whole. The
President's speech at Eureka College offered the Soviet Union a far-
reaching and permanent program of cooperation. It also announced
our unshakable determination to defend our interests, and to insist on
the fundamental principle,pacta sunt servanda, treaties must be kept, as
the bedrock on which peaceful international society is built. Without
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the effective implementation of this policy, the essence of our national
interest, we may make agreements, but there will be no peace. As Sec-
retary Haig commented in a recent speech, it must be understood that
arms control agreements are of no use if they make the world safe for
conventional aggression.27
The menace of the nuclear weapon is so great that it should lead the
nations at long last to realize that there is no rational alternative to
peace. Sound, equitable, and verifiable nuclear arms agreements could
reduce the risk of war. In themselves they cannot guarantee peace, or
even the absence of nuclear war. But arms control agreements should
be viewed as stepping-stones to a much greater goal-peace itself.
When the Soviet Union proposes that we sign a no-fIrst-use pledge, the
proper answer for the United States is that both nations, and all other
nations, should rededicate themselves fundamentally to policies of full
and reciprocal respect for the rules of the United Nations Charter
against all forms of aggression, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. In the
nuclear world, no lesser goal can suffice. Peace really has become
indivisible.
The United States and its allies and other nations which accept the
principles of peace have more than enough power and potential power
to achieve this goal, if they muster up the will to do so. It is time for the
Soviet Union to realize that its policies of expansion have passed their
peak, and produced not bread but a stone. There are many objective
reasons why the Soviet Union should want a period of stability in its
relations with the West-its troubles in Poland and Eastern Europe; the
state of its economy; and many social problems which have become
manifest in recent years. Above all, the Soviet Union, like every other
country, should understand the truth behind Khruschev's famous com-
ment, "The nuclear weapon threatens Socialist and Capitalist states
alike."
Many are offering quick fixes and miraculous cures for the ills which
afflict mankind. And others have lost their nerve, and are looking for
escape hatches. The medicine men and the escapists should be recog-
nized for what they are. There are no quick fixes, or escape hatches
either.
But the American people and their leaders are not going to lose their
nerve or bend their knees. The threat we face can be countered by the
methods of steady diplomacy backed by adequate deterrent force.
27. Speech before Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Stud-
ies, Apr. 6, 1982, reprinted in N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1982, at 8, col. 1.
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President Reagan has made it clear many times that the tragic lesson of
the Thirties is burned into his mind and into his memory. The states-
men of that time failed to prevent the Second World War because they
refused to accept the super-obvious facts. In the setting of nuclear
weapons, it is imperative that the statesmen of the West succeed this
time not only in preventing war but in estab~shingpeace.
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